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Abstract 
 
This paper introduces an innovation – CBM-lite - designed by a small Uganda NGO to 
remedy the shortfall of operation and maintenance (O&M) funds, identified as the key 
explanation behind the poor sustainability record of the Community Based Management 
(CBM) model. Without a radical change in government and NGO policy concerning post-
construction support, the financing of hand pump O&M must come from communities 
themselves: hence the user pays principle is fundamental. CBM-lite aims to reduce hand 
pump downtime by replacing the voluntary Water User Committees with an incentivised 
Water Operator bolstering the user pays principle, and through an insurance-style micro-
finance product that ensures funds are available for expedient repairs. This innovation 
refines organisation and governance arrangements of CBM, but as the rules of operation 
and enforcement of sanctions are communally arranged, remains within the existing 
institutional framework of CBM. Drawing on original and extensive ethnographic fieldwork, 
surveys and interviews, we argue that a relational reading of risk applied to an innovation 
that deviates from mainstream CBM goes some way towards explaining the intransigence 
within the rural water sector. This novel application of relational risk theory advances the 
conceptual and empirical contribution of geography to the conundrum of realising 
sustainability in the rural water sector. The known risks associated with CBM - a third of 
hand pumps being non-functional at any one time - may be seen as preferable to potential 
harm to ideology, to policy coherence, to organisational reputation, and to social and cultural 
norms.  Finally, the study reconsiders current views about rural water management - notably 
the actual level of support for the user pays principle, key to both CBM and CBM-lite. 
Unpacking sectoral inertia assumes greater significance with estimates that 57% of the 
global population will be reliant on communally managed water sources by 2020. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Since the 1990s, groundwater in rural Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been managed in 
accordance with the Community Based Management (CBM) principles of the user paying 
for water, with a voluntary community management regime. This is endorsed by donor 
approval and government policy. The central concern of this paper is to unpack why there 
is still strong sector support for CBM and little appetite for radical reform, given the mounting 
criticism of CBM’s sustainability record, with hand pump functionality rates little improved 
from the state-led paradigm - a third of hand pumps being non-functional at any one time 
(Baumann, 2006; Oxford/RFL, 2014; RWSN, 2010).  
 
We argue that the perseverance with the CBM model is accounted for by two concurrent 
explanations. Firstly, there is no sector-wide agreement on the causes of hand pump failure: 
Carter & Ross (2016) suggest that the primary reason for the failure of rural water schemes 
is the low yield of ground water, poor water quality and mechanical failure.  Another 
emerging body of literature believes that the dearth of Operation and Maintenance (O&M) 
finance is the key explanation (IRC/Triple-S, 2012; Jones, 2011; Le Gouais and Wach, 
2013), compounded by a general disinclination for voluntary management via the Water 
User Committees and failures to sanction free-riding. Amid such differences of opinion, there 
is little common ground over a possible way forward. Even where there is a shared problem 
analysis – dearth of O&M funds – that literature itself diverges over recommendations, 
ranging from the use of mobile technologies to capacity building efforts and more external 
post-construction support. Such adjustments are all attempts to bolster payment levels and 
in fact constitute only minor alterations to mainstream CBM (van den Broek & Brown 2015). 
For until donors and governments are prepared to fund or subsidise long-term O&M 
expenditure (Baumann’s 2006 CBM-Plus model requires 70% state contribution) the reality 
is that developers are forced to re-engage with the user pays principle, whether they are 
comfortable with it or not.  
 
The second explanation is that the complex situation outlined above is intensified by the 
very nature of innovation, which involves risk-taking and unknown outcomes (Vasvári 2015). 
We utilise relational risk theory (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011), outlined in the second 
section, below, to explore how known risks associated with CBM may be preferable to 
potential harm arising from the introduction of any innovation in the rural water sector. 
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We align ourselves in this paper with the literature that identifies the lack of O&M funds and 
management failings as the root cause of the high level of malfunctioning hand pumps, and 
present a modified version of CBM that strengthens the user pays principle. CBM-lite, as we 
have called it, is not offered as a silver bullet. Rather, we use its conception and progress 
towards piloting – viewed from the perspective of relational risk – as a vehicle to gain insights 
into what stakeholders value, which may be threatened by the proposed changes brought 
about by CMB-lite. 
 
The paper, based on original and extensive ethnographic fieldwork, household surveys, 
interviews and focus groups, covers the period of the design of CBM-lite through to initial 
piloting in 4 villages (August 2012 to August 2013). A subsequent paper will explore the 
actual outcomes of the pilot (August 2013 until March 2015). Conclusions are drawn that 
suggest relational risk theory may provide important insights into the prevailing sector-wide 
inertia around substantive reform. 
 
Relational Risk Theory  
Relational risk theory, developed by Boholm and Corvellec (2011) building on work by 
Hilgartner (1992), comprises three elements for interpreting how and why individuals and 
social groups have different risk perceptions of the same event.  The first component, risk 
object, is something that is identified as a danger or harm. Examples include natural 
phenomena, manufactured products, behaviour, and in our case an innovation in the rural 
water sector.  It is considered in some way and under certain circumstances to threaten the 
second component, the object at risk. The object at risk has human value and is linked to 
loss, vulnerability and the need for protection. This potential harm may or may not happen. 
A relationship of risk (the third component) must establish that it is the risk object that 
threatens the object at risk, and explain how and possibly why. Interpretation is a key 
feature: our decoding of the connection was the result of extensive deliberations between 
the authors, for the relational aspect of risk theory is a constructed phenomenon involving 
subjective connections made by an observer: “imagined, crafted, and established” (Boholm 
and Corvellec, 2011 p180). Once identified, the risk object takes on a certain independence: 
it is fluid according to context. Latour (1996) had already observed that risk objects and 
objects at risk are not fixed, but subject to reassessment. 
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The terminology used in the theory is clever and confusing at the same time: clever because 
risk and object are transposed, underscoring the fluidity of risk; confusing because of their 
close similarity. To aid clarity we propose risk posing object and threatened object at risk.  
Conceptions of risk are found to be culturally biased by socially embedded values and 
beliefs (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011). Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) argue in their cultural 
theory of risk that risk perceptions can be explained by world views, further developed by 
Kahan in his cultural cognition thesis (see Kahan et al, 2011). A full immersion into the 
cultural theory of risk is not called for here, but it is useful to be aware there are differences 
amongst members of any community: strong group ties stem from a shared belief in order, 
stability, continuity and responsibility, or have their origins in an ideologically-driven altruism. 
Weaker group allegiance is evident in those minimally committed to their community, 
‘rubbing along’ as best they can, or in individuals primarily alert to opportunities for self-
advancement. Neither category is immune to the opinion of others.  
Boholm observes (2003) that the same external phenomenon (risk posing object) will result 
in widely different perceptions of harm (threatened object at risk) according to the strength 
and nature of group ties. Thus the same risk posing object, in this context an innovation in 
the rural water sector, may be seen as destabilising, as an affront to a cherished ideology, 
an irksome block to free-riding, or as a business opportunity. In the last case a business 
venture may rebound and inflict damage on the would-be entrepreneur, exemplifying the 
fluidity of the risk posing object and threatened object at risk. The key is in identifying what 
is held to be of value by different stakeholders, and how it may be harmed. The present 
writers are offering their interpretation of stakeholder attitudes and actions as noted, an 
inherently subjective undertaking. 
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Community Based Management and CBM-lite  
 
Meaningful information about what strategies may or may not improve hand pump 
sustainability can only be accumulated through organisations testing innovations based on 
their own problem analysis and goals.  CBM-lite is a practitioner-developed model with the 
aim of improving the parlous funding situation for O&M of hand pumps1 observed in the 
study area in Uganda by the designers, reducing hand pump downtime and ensuring 
communities have access to a sustainably managed water point. CMB-lite sought to 
reinforce the user pays principle by overcoming the reluctance of communities to pay for 
maintenance as observed in both the study area (see van den Broek and Brown, 2015), and 
more broadly in Uganda (Harvey, 2008).  
 
To assist comparison between mainstream CBM and CBM-lite we utilise Bakker’s (2007) 
three resource management categories, developed to promote a more nuanced analysis of 
neo-liberal reforms in the urban water sector. Bakker’s first category is institutions, covering 
primary goals, regulatory frameworks and property rights. CBM-lite was designed to operate 
within the existing CBM institutional framework. The important differences between CBM 
and CBM-lite occur within the second and third categories – organisation and governance – 
and are set out in Table 1.  
 
  
                                                        
1 The NGO in the study area fitted Consallen hand pumps, which are broadly acknowledged to be superior to 
the India Mark II or III hand pumps used by the government; the former use polyethylene rising mains and 
stainless steel rods and are considered corrosion resistant.  All hand pumps are subject to wear and tear, but 
Consallen are accepted as more robust than India Mark II and III, despite the latter being government policy. 
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Table 1 Comparing CBM and CBM-lite 
  CBM 
Reality and Challenges 
of CBM 
CBM-lite CBM-lite Assumptions 
Resource 
management 
organisation  
   
Organisational 
structure 
Elected voluntary 
Water User 
Committee 
(WUC) (6-10 
members) for 
each water point 
in a village.  
Unclear leadership. 
Different rules per 
water point making it 
difficult to monitor and 
address handpump 
governance Van den 
Broek and Broek 2015. 
Elected voluntary 
Water User 
Committee (WUC) (6-
10 members) for each 
water point in a 
village.  
Water Operator provides 
clearer line of 
responsibility. Presence of 
a leader is more important 
than the number of people 
managing a water point, 
(Cleaver, 1999) and may 
improve the execution of 
Operation and 
Maintenance tasks.  
Resource 
Governance 
    
Financial 
Accountability 
All households 
(registered 
exemptions - 
eldery, female-
headed 
households and 
disabled) 
expected to pay 
water source 
caretaker 1,000 
Ugandan 
Shillings  per 
month. Fees 
stored by the 
WUC within 
community. 
Lack of financial 
accountability over 
collected fees by WUC 
leading to breakdown 
of trust and wide-
spread non-payment 
(Naiga et al 2015; Quin 
et al. 2011; Wittington 
et al 2009).  Dearth of 
collected funds results 
in  extended handpump 
downtime (van den 
Broek and Brown, 
2015). 
No increase in Water 
User Fee and 
exemptions register 
maintained due to 
clustering (also 
advocated by Foster 
et al 2015). Savings 
and Credit 
Cooperative 
(SACCO) provides an 
insurance-style 
product to Water 
Operator.  
SACCO funds can only be 
accessed for repairs with 
signatures of handpump 
mechanic, and village 
councillor (LC1).  SACCO 
passbook available to for 
accountability. Water 
Operator makes the 
regular deposits.  
Transparency: anticipated 
to induce willingness to pay 
(Cooke, 2001).  
Willingness to pay surveys 
are accurate. Water 
Operator makes the 
regular deposits.  SACCO 
is capitalised. 
Key incentives Non-monetary 
rewards - WUC 
members acting 
altruistically. 
WUCs argue for 
financial incentives (or 
as justification for use 
of fees) as 
compensation for role 
and sanctioning. WUC 
do not pay the water 
fee (van den Broek and 
Brown 2015). 
The SACCO fixed fee 
is paid out of the 
collected water user 
fee. Remaining funds 
are the Water 
Operator’s incentive 
from which caretakers 
remunerated.  
Community happy to pay 
for Water Operator 
incentive.  Incentive 
enough to motivate Water 
Operator in O&M (see 
Harvey, 2008). Fixed 
SACCO fee means has to 
ensure high level of 
payment (89.5%) in order 
to realise incentive. 
Key sanctions Social pressure 
and community 
formulated 
graduated 
sanctions to curb 
free-riding 
culminating in 
exclusion from 
source. 
Recourse to 
Sub-County 
officials (higher 
level).  
Difficult to enforce; 
have to pay Sub-
county. Use alternative 
source managed by a 
different WUC (ibid).  
Roles, responsibilities 
and community 
agreed sanctions 
formalised in a 
contract signed by 
Water Operator, 
elected village 
councillor (LC1), Sub-
County and NGO 
officials, witnessed at 
community meeting. 
Contact details of 
Sub-County 
publicised.  Oversight 
provided by Sub-
County and NGO on 
functionality and 
handpump repairs.  
Level of Water Operator 
remuneration dependent 
on collecting fees: 
incentive to curtail 
community free-riding 
including neighbours and 
family.  Community support 
for sanctioning. LC1 
supportive. Community 
reports issues to Sub-
County who will provide 
oversight aong with NGO. 
Level of training by NGO 
adequate. Workload of 
Water Operator 
manageable. 
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The most significant organisational change has been the replacement of the voluntary WUC 
at each water point with a single resident Water Operator, contracted through a competitive 
application process with the final choice made by the community, and subsequently 
responsible for the O&M of a cluster of village water points (balancing clarity about rules 
with economies of scale), for a period of three years. Water Operators needed to have some 
capital behind them as they would be required to open a regular Savings and Credit 
Cooperative (SACCO) customer account costing 75,000 Shillings (US$ 29 or £192), and 
demonstrate entrepreneurial and leadership potential.  
 
With the third category – governance - we are looking at incentives, accountability and 
sanctions. The CBM-lite model incentivises the water operator with financial remuneration 
drawn from the water user fees to promote a lasting inducement to carry out O&M duties. 
Storing collected funds in a SACCO 3  account was hoped to improve trust levels and 
willingness to pay the water user fee, which remained at 1,000 Shillings per month. The 
function of the SACCO was extended to incorporate an insurance-style product to allow for 
major repairs, with checks and balances as outlined in Table 1, in the event that saved funds 
are not enough. It was agreed that the SACCO would charge a monthly interest rate of 0.5 
per cent over the money borrowed for O&M based on estimated costs of maintenance and 
repair over the three year concession, calculated and projected by using existing data in the 
WASHcost benchmarks (Burr & Fonseca 2013).  
 
Under CBM-lite the decisions concerning the rules of operation and sanctions for non-
payment are to remain locally determined by the community, as would be the case under 
conventional CBM, and formalised in a contract signed by all key stakeholders at a 
community meeting.  
 
Study site and methods  
 
Our study centres on the multi-ethnic (with 56 recognised languages), and predominantly 
rural, mid-west Ugandan districts of Kiryandongo and Masindi, where subsistence farming 
dominates, with an average monthly income of 185,000 Shillings, and where 21.4 per cent 
live on less than US$1 per person per day (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Public 
                                                        
2 Uganda Shilling to Sterling exchange rate in August 2013 was 0.000250. 
3 In 2006, the government of Uganda capitalised SACCOs in each sub-county to increase access to finance 
in rural areas (Makoba, 2011). 
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support for trialling CBM-lite was gauged in six villages in Kigumba sub-county of 
Kiryandongo district, which had shallow hand-dug wells constructed by either local 
government or a local Ugandan Water And Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) NGO4.  The 
innovation was piloted in four villages: Mpumwe, a relatively large village of 297 households 
with six hand pumps; Nyakatugo, located close to the town of Kigumba, with 132 households 
and three hand pumps; Mboira II, a poor immigrant village of 147 households with two hand 
pumps and a protected spring, and Nyakabette II, a large village of 264 households with 
three hand pumps (see Figure 1). 
 
  
                                                        
4 Established in 2008 and funded by USA philanthropic donors, the NGO had one Director based in New 
York, a Programme Manager and 15 Ugandan fieldstaff at the time of fieldwork. 
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Figure 1 Map of study area  
 
Source: Paul Carter 
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The comprehensive dataset presented is a result of action research, ethnographic fieldwork, 
surveys and interviews over the period of March 2011 – June 2014. The second author, who 
initiated the development of the CBM-lite model, was embedded in the day-to-day realities 
of local communities as the Programme Manager of the small WASH NGO specialising in 
the construction of shallow hand-dug wells, from June 2012-January 2014. Two surveys, 
with open-ended questions, were designed and implemented by the NGO: a six day 
‘Willingness to Participate’ survey of 150 randomly selected household respondents across 
six Kigumba sub-county villages, and a ‘Willingness to Pay’ survey amongst all 1,138 
households in the four selected pilot villages over seventeen days. Between July 2013 and 
June 2014 21 in-depth interviews were conducted, either individually or jointly by the 
authors, with NGO staff members; local and national government officials; SACCO and 
insurance company representatives and finally the four water operators. In all four pilot 
villages, focus groups were arranged and community meetings observed. A forum meeting 
of NGOs headquartered in Kampala was also attended. Ultimately, the purpose of data 
collection was to gauge attitudes towards CBM-lite, its potential rewards and risks, in order 
to identify what elements of the innovation comprise the principal risk posing objects and 
what values may be harmed i.e. threated risk objects.  
 
Findings 
 
The case study focuses on the development and initial implementation of CBM-lite and the 
attendant risk perceptions of the different stakeholders.  
 
A consensus emerged during the latter half of 2012 between the WASH NGO and local 
government officials in the case study area of Masindi and Kiryandongo Districts over the 
causes of hand pump non-functionality and the precarious state of many others. Irrespective 
of location, type of hand pump, project implementer, population size or heterogeneity, the 
common denominator was the dearth of collected water user fees to pay the hand pump 
mechanics.  Ineffectual voluntary Water User Committees (WUCs), considered 
untrustworthy over the safe keeping of funds, constitute a significant factor in the failure of 
the CBM model: a community member in Nyakatugo said,  “the challenge of the WUC is that 
they don’t give accountability. That is why we lost trust in them” (13 September, 2013): this 
is ostensibly a rationale for withholding payment.  From the perspective of WUC members, 
extracting money from reluctant and often abusive community members was a thankless 
task: “it is very difficult to get money from people. I am tired of it. There is that chance that I 
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will leave” (Kyakamese village 13 June, 2104). NGO staff, who monitored activities post-
construction, found there were often only a couple of active WUC members, if any, for each 
source, with another local NGO representative wryly suggesting “voluntarism is dead” (22 
November 2013).  
 
The second author, appointed Programme Manager in June 2012 with experience of other 
regions in Uganda with an international NGO, realised along with her team, that the pattern 
outlined above was widespread, and misgivings about the CBM model itself began to creep 
in: “it is quite fascinating why I had not thought about it…..we did not question the model 
and whether the WUCs were working or not……it is a friendly concept – people do it for 
their community, and whistle while they collect money and keep it in a box in their mud 
house” (11 August, 2013).  She came to realise how uncritically she had accepted 
community-based approaches. It was the opportunity of working with a small regional NGO 
that made it possible to explore alternatives that deviate from the CBM framework.  
   
In order to combat the real or perceived misuse of funds, it seemed desirable to put in place 
“a wall between the manager and the money” (13 August 2013), and at the same time 
investigate bespoke insurance-style financial products that could allow water operators to 
authorise costly repairs immediately, before routine contributions could be built up. This way, 
hand pump downtime would be kept to a minimum. However, financial services in Uganda 
have a chequered record: the Masindi District Chairman suggested insurance companies 
are “…not trustworthy….I would never insure my property; if something happened they 
already would have eaten my money! And, what would happen if the hand pumps don’t 
break down?” (27 November, 2013)5. In the event, after eight months it was the insurance 
company that pulled out after concluding that they could not cover for wear and tear of the 
pumps. The NGO now approached the Uganda Savings and Credit Union Limited (a 
SACCO) which had a reliable reputation, and its manager saw a potential business 
opportunity in CBM-lite: “[i]f this model works, other villages and water operators will follow” 
(17 April, 2013) and felt “[i]t is very unlikely that all hand pumps break down at once” (8 
August 2013).  
 
                                                        
5 Local concerns over insurance companies were vindicated when in January 2015 the Uganda Insurance 
Regulatory Authority withdrew the licence of the company due to mismanagement. 
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Despite a shared problem analysis, there were two very different responses from two 
adjacent districts over possible ways forward.  The District Water Officer of Kiryandongo and 
the sub-county chief of Kigumba welcomed the model: “This pilot is good as people will feel 
the money is secure” (13 June 2013). According to the Assistant Engineer Kiryandongo (20 
August 2013) “most (hand pumps) break down because the money is not there. The 
advantage of the pilot (CBM-lite) is the funds are there”. By contrast, Masindi District 
declined the opportunity to participate in piloting CBM-lite, citing the risk of poor services 
and misuse of funds, and the possibility that incentivising the Water Operator could 
exacerbate community tensions. 
With the support of Kiryandongo District it was agreed to identify potential pilot villages within 
Kigumba sub-county, and determine village-wide appetite for CBM-lite, necessary for 
clustering sources under a standardised set of rules managed by a single operator. To this 
end the NGO identified six “problematic communities” with non-functional WUCs and hand 
pumps in disrepair (in Mpumwe a third of the nine pumps were non-functional) (11 August 
2013). With the approval of the village councillors (LC1), the Willingness to Participate 
household survey was undertaken with 150 households across the six villages, with women 
often being the respondents. Following an overview of the key principles of CBM-lite, four 
structured questions were augmented by explanatory open-ended questions. NGO field 
officers also mapped the main features of the villages, the location of water sources, their 
status and estimated O&M costs.  
 
The Willingness to Participate survey (N 150), undertaken February-March 2013, found very 
strong support for the central tenets of CBM-lite – in particular the monthly payment of 1,000 
Shillings (93.3% support). Householder respondents recognised that a financial incentive 
taken from funds collected was a positive step (89%): “he will work hard because he needs 
the profit as well” (Nyakatugo, 13 March 2013), although doubters felt that maximising profit 
might become a priority over providing clean water. The insurance package and secure 
deposit provided by the SACCO found favour with 87% of respondents, who believed it 
could increase willingness to pay because “money will be kept well” (Mboira II), and “even 
if this person has a sick person, he/she cannot access the money” (Nyakatugo, 13 March 
2013). The assurance of funds for O&M won approval “here the community is assured” (of 
money for repair). Some did not trust the Water Operator to bank the funds and had 
misgivings about SACCOs, but thought it could be a welcome change because “WUCs are 
always inactive”. The biggest area of doubt was centred on lack of trust in having a single 
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Water Operator (19% thought of this as a risk): an individual could “take away our powers 
as water users”. The three-year concession concerned some if an unscrupulous Water 
Operator was appointed, and also there was a feeling the role could prove too much to 
expect from one individual, even with the assistance of caretakers.  
 
The second survey, running concurrently, captured all households in the six potential pilot 
villages and was undertaken by the NGO. It focused solely on Willingness to Pay 1,000 
Shillings per month for guaranteed O&M – the crux of the innovation. Of the surveyed 1,138 
households, 98.86% (1,125) were supportive “as long as it is accounted for” (Nykabette II, 
21 March 2013) and “because no one in this village cannot afford 1,000 Shillings per month” 
(Kifuruta III, 14 March 2013). Reasons for refusal by the minority were the existence of an 
alternative source, which charged 5,000 Shillings per annum, and a seasonal shortage of 
cash, rather than affordability per se.  
 
The outcomes of both surveys justified proceeding with piloting CMB-lite in three (later 
extended to four) of the six surveyed villages6. Pilot implementation, which commenced in 
August 2013 (Nyakabette II in October 2013), followed a similar pattern in all the villages: 
NGO, local government and SACCO representatives attended community meetings, which 
were poorly attended (50 out of 290 households in Mpumwe). Arrangements were made to 
appoint a Water Operator who had to apply in writing for the post and demonstrate his/her 
suitability. The candidates selected (by a show of hands in a public meeting) tended to be 
better-educated (for example the Mpumwe Water Operator had been a secondary school 
teacher), had proved themselves in business (the Mboira Water Operator ran a public 
market and the Nyakatugo Water Operator owned a mobile phone repair shop), and were 
all considered trustworthy. The register of vulnerable households, notably elderly and 
widowed, that were exempt from paying the water user charge under CBM was reconfirmed 
in accordance with their human right to water. A two-day Water Operator training session 
with the NGO and SACCO, followed by contract signing, completed the process.  
                                                        
6 To illustrate the financial breakdown of CBM-lite, if the 297 households were charged the agreed tariff of 
1,000 shillings per month, the maximum monthly revenue for Mpumwe village was 297,000 shillings 
(however, the list of eligible exemptions would reduce this slightly). The estimated O&M costs over three 
years for 6 sources was 4,237,380 Shillings: 1,539,000 Shillings for minor repairs; 2,052,000 Shillings for 
major repairs and SACCO interest rate of 0.5% per month (646,380 Shillings). The monthly SACCO 
payment was thus 118,000 Shillings leaving a maximum monthly incentive of 197,000 Shillings (£49.25) out 
of which the caretakers’ remuneration was paid. 
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As we moved closer to the implementation stage, a marked change took place in the risk 
perceptions of the community. In meetings to decide on the rules of operation and sanctions 
for non-payment of the water user fee (called ‘byelaws’ locally), and attended principally by 
men, the foremost concern was payment of the water user fee. Surveys had shown almost 
universal support, yet “1,000 shillings is too much for us to pay” (Nyakabette II, 13 June 
2014) signalled a shift in attitude. Having to pay at the time stipulated by the Water Operator 
was not popular: “you cannot touch where your height cannot reach” referred to seasonal 
variation in income, yet allowing users to pay as and when they could spelt chaos and 
unnecessary work for the operator.  
 
Appointed Water Operators identified risks to their social standing as a result of being 
salaried by the water user fee, and the Mpumwe operator even claimed he would be working 
on a voluntary basis in a public meeting, reasoning afterwards that: “it is very bad to hear 
for community members that I will earn money”  (9 August, 2013). From the outset this 
incentive had been made clear. The female Water Operator of Nyakabette II told a 
community meeting “I don’t want you to charm me (use witchcraft) because I am hard” (13 
June, 2014) referring to enforcing user payments. Water Operators also felt the former WUC 
members could disrupt the pilot: “[t]he WUC are resisting now. They don’t want to talk about 
the money [previously collected] they thought I would dig… so they dodge. They did not 
come to the meetings. They want free access to water” (Nyakatugo Water Operator, 7 
August, 2013). The community bye-laws (locally-agreed rules) were the sole mechanism for 
punishing free-riders: in Mpumwe village it was agreed that the Water Operator could 
confiscate water collection cans after three warnings in one month and if the owner failed to 
pay within three days, the can could be sold. The thorny issue of dealing with habitual free-
riders was brought up in a meeting in Nyakabette II: “Are there people that can arrest those 
people that are not willing to pay?” (13 June, 2014).  
 
The authors were invited to present the model at a meeting convened 21 August 2013 in 
Kampala to national and international NGOs based there. The problem analysis that 
identified failing WUCs and flaws within the CBM model was not well received: “I have just 
visited a village last week and the WUC was doing fine,” with another stressing “our 
organisation believes in the strengths of the WUC.”  It was insisted that any issues over 
payment could be solved by “sensitising”, “building capacity” and “changing their mind sets”.  
A prevalent viewpoint was that being forced to pay was likely to push people to use 
contaminated water, putting health at risk. Another objection was the use of the SACCO as 
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provider of an insurance-style product: “they are not an insurance company”, and risks were 
foreseen. It was felt that deviations from the CBM model could harm the sector as a result 
of creating a lack of coherence and consistency. In sum, the reaction from these NGOs was 
discouraging, with the concluding advice: “come back when you have evidence that the 
model is working.” 
 
A similar response about the potential threat of the pilot to the CBM framework was 
expressed by the director of the Directorate of Water and Development of the Ministry of 
Water and Environment: “[w]e have the O&M framework. We are happy about this. I request 
the NGOs to support the WUC. To me it doesn’t matter if you leave. As long as you don’t 
disorganise the framework. The government does not have the flexibility to try out. For us, 
we have to get it right the first time” (25 November 2013).  
 
Discussion  
Based on our interpretations, the CBM-lite package appeared to embody multiple risk posing 
objects to the strongly held and valued beliefs of several stakeholder groups. To exemplify 
the usefulness of a relational reading of risk we take a central component of CBM-lite7: a 
single Water Operator incentivised to collect the water user fees. This risk posing object 
refracts into multiple threatened objects at risk (Figure 2), and affords the opportunity to 
discuss why and how innovations in the water sector pose risks to national and local scale 
actors, with consequences for the sector as a whole.  
 
  
                                                        
7 There are other risk objects emanating from CBM-lite – such as microfinance insurance style financial 
product offered by the SACCO and the village level clustering of pumps for economies of scale which could 
also be subjected to scrutiny. 
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Figure 2 Relationship between single paid water operator (risk posing object) and the 
identified threatened object(s) at risk by stakeholder group 
 
     
Source: Authors' construct 
 
Bakker’s (2007) three-tier framework, set out above, is particularly helpful at this point. 
Ostensibly CBM-lite has not affected the institutional level of CBM policy. The organisation 
and governance levels have, however, been adjusted with important ramifications for 
mainstream CBM. The community still sets the rules of use, and carries out sanctions under 
CBM-lite, and pumps are not owned by the water operator. Yet undeniably CBM-lite 
destabilises the foundations upon which CBM rests; by disbanding WUCs it erodes 
opportunities for voluntary community collective action, thereby undermining one of the two 
pillars of CBM policy. However, at the same time the innovation strengthens the 
complementary ‘user pays principle’ of mainstream CBM. 
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Commencing with the national and international NGOs with headquarters in Kampala, it was 
clear from our meeting that removing the WUCs and replacing them with a single operator 
clashed with their commitment to community collective action, and retention of communal 
responsibility for effecting punishment for non-payment was no consolation. Reflecting on 
organisational priorities and ethics is important at this juncture: the explicit goal of the 
developers of CBM-lite was sustainable access to water and the vehicle was an incentivised 
water operator. Our subsequent deliberations highlighted a different set of priorities for 
NGOs attendees: social justice and a sense of fairness.  An innovation that replaces a 
fundamental component of community management – voluntary WUCs – with an already 
relatively advantaged individual placed in a position to benefit financially out of the water 
user fee could be viewed as reinforcing inequity and running counter to a social justice 
agenda. Concentrating power into the hands of one individual could have undesirable social 
consequences – a point brought up by the Masindi District Water Officer. This raises the 
whole issue of water, payment and profit leading in the direction of professionalisation and 
a move to the political right. Profiting from water is deeply contentious in NGO circles 
(Adams & Halvorsen 2014) and we note links to the urban water literature where control 
over access to water becomes a “formidable source of social power” (Swyngedouw, 2006: 
15). Fears at the Kampala meeting were expressed about possible high-handed treatment, 
even denial of water to community members failing to pay.   
In addition, because payment would be more strictly enforced under CBM-lite as the Water 
Operator was incentivised, the large national and international NGO representatives 
protested that the health of communities could be put at risk since they could be driven to 
use contaminated surface water. It seems plausible that the issue of health could also be a 
cover for the real threatened object at risk for these NGOs: reservations about paying for 
water at all. It must be stressed there was no price increase with CBM-lite, the register of 
exemptions was to be maintained and free-riding was meant to be curtailed by communally-
agreed sanctions as under mainstream CBM. Work by van den Broek and Brown (2015) 
suggests free-riding is the norm under CBM. Our experience is that ‘off the record’, many 
officials of larger NGOs are not fully committed to encouraging the user pays principle post 
construction, widely conveying the sentiment that “water should be free” in accordance with 
the human right to water, as also observed by  Quin et al. (2011). Taking a social justice 
perspective, the water user fee under both CBM and CBM-lite, with the exemptions, is really 
a regressive form of taxation – in that all households despite income levels are charged a 
flat rate of 1,000 – reinforcing inequitable outcomes. From our experiences in Uganda, we 
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suggest that enforcing the user pays principle does not in reality sit comfortably with many 
NGO officials, despite official policy. To what extent this has contributed to the dire O&M 
statistics for CBM could be an important research agenda, with implications for any 
innovation based on the user pays principle. This example also shows there is a need to be 
alert to the fact that behind a stated benevolent concern (health) there may be an underlying 
value that stakeholders prefer to shield. The implications of the foregoing are not that the 
NGOs prioritise social justice over long-term access to water, rather they were critical of the 
chosen vehicle to deliver it (a Water Operator incentivised to uphold the user pays principle): 
an ethical line was perceived to be crossed.  
The central Government sees its policy coherence threatened by CBM-lite and its single 
paid Water Operator, an opinion shared by the national and international NGO 
representatives. Islands of innovation randomly set up at the margins create confusion and 
indicate a weakening of the Government’s overarching control, and could be interpreted as 
a signal of dissatisfaction with mainstream CBM. Comments by the Ministry representative 
indicated the Government would not stop local NGOs from experimenting, but this was not 
to be at the cost of destabilising the current CBM framework. Linked to policy coherence as 
a threatened object at risk is the goodwill of the international donors. They have invested 
long and heavily in the CBM principle, and uncertainty could have implications for funding 
streams and organisational spheres of influence. Put simply, piloting an alternative, such as 
CBM-lite, may be perceived as implicit recognition of the failings of CBM.  
The central government representative made it clear that there is little room to experiment 
and learn from mistakes. The public sector often becomes paralysed as a result of increased 
uncertainty, and attributes its risk-averse nature to the personal and organisational costs of 
failure (Townsend, 2013). Our findings support Douglas and Wildovsky’s (1982:189) 
suggestion that  “no change ever comes from the centre” which has a strong commitment 
to the status quo: “all innovation comes from without” from “the margins of society”, in this 
case represented by small local NGOs.   
 
What the larger NGOs and government have in common are strong group ties and a 
commitment to shoring up CBM. The foregoing helps explain the inertia in the rural water 
sector, and explains why it is unlikely that radical change will be inspired by either central 
government or central NGO actors, and why changes and ideas amenable to the centre are 
“those best known and closest to existing programmes” (ibid:93). They have the power to 
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stifle innovation, yet sector-wide change is a top-down process that ultimately central 
government has to sanction and implement (Townsend, 2013).  
 
At the local level, we identify stakeholders with looser group ties. For the rank and file 
community members, numerically the largest stakeholder group, the cited threatened object 
at risk was money. This is another example of a cover for an underlying threatened object 
at risk. Our research suggests that affordability is not the issue in the case study area (also 
see van den Broek and Brown 2015): an opportunity cost perhaps, but one that would 
purchase very little (one third of a bottle of beer). Rather, a principle is at stake, the symbolic 
meaning represented by their money being used to pay a water operator. Often heard in this 
connection is the graphic expression “eating my money”: the thought rankles to have to sit 
by while a fellow villager grows fat on money you have paid out for a service. A paid Water 
Operator directly offends the community’s sense of fairness, a threatened object at risk and 
sentiment shared by NGOs and Masindi District on behalf of communities. The issue runs 
deeper than this, however. We believe there exists an unwritten code of conduct, evident 
from the concerns of the Water Operators (discussed shortly), that puts one in mind of the 
Scandinavian law of Jante: people should not feel or act superior to their neighbours, and 
to do so is an affront to a sense of homogeneity  – the real threatened value and object at 
risk, rather than money per se. On the one hand there is evidence of loose group ties 
manifested in a lack of community spirit, a sense that  “voluntarism is dead”, disaffection 
and deep mistrust, yet at the same time community members are bound by a collective code 
of conduct they fear to break: inertia is also evident at the local level. These potentially self-
defeating, even myopic, behaviour patterns could take root and result in withholding 
payment, leading to hand pump breakdown, inconvenience and possibly to sickness, rather 
than seeing a Water Operator profit.  
Disbanded WUC members are an elite group within communities: when a single Water 
Operator takes over, they stand to lose the perks of their position (another threatened object 
at risk): elected status, free water and accessing the collected funds. Their displeasure can 
be inferred from the boycott of public meetings about CBM-lite and their evasion over 
previously-collected water user fees.  
To date in the analysis, the Water Operator has been the embodiment of the risk posing 
object to the valued threatened objects at risk of other stakeholder groups (Figure 2). Our 
focus now shifts to the fluidity of risk, exemplified by the positions of the Water Operator, the 
local NGO project designer and finally former WUC members. Applicants for the Water 
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Operator positions exhibited entrepreneurial spirit in pursuing a business opportunity to 
supplement their income. Initiative and a desire for self-advancement may set an individual 
apart, but does not necessarily indicate indifference to public opinion or community welfare. 
Hitherto the Water Operators were the risk posing object, but they find themselves on the 
receiving end of a threat – their business becomes a threatened object at risk. It might be 
described as a Janus style role; simultaneously a risk posing object, and a threatened risk 
at object. This role change is subject to certain circumstances, such as the failure to collect 
water user fees, or the failure by the community to deter free-riding, in which case the Water 
Operator’s position could become untenable. Business success apart, a threatened object 
at risk for the operator is acceptance in the community – Jante-style ostracism could be the 
price he/she has to pay. Concerns on this count were raised by the Water Operators, and 
sometimes reflected in a pretence that no remuneration was involved. The designer of CBM-
lite is similarly placed to the Water Operator: circumstances that may undermine the 
operator are likely to discredit the driving force behind the innovation along with the 
organisation she represents.  
SACCOs, which can also be viewed as a risk posing object “eating” the communities’ money 
and/or failing, with the loss of community funds – a not unlikely event - may also become a 
threatened object at risk if non-payment and unchecked free-riding pre-dominate – these 
may become the new risk posing object in-waiting. The community meetings and interviews 
with Masindi District Chairman highlighted the lack of comprehension over how insurance 
works - to guarantee speedy repairs and continuous access – and that premiums have to 
be paid regardless of whether claims to finance pump repairs are made. Paying for 
something that is not broken appeared counterintuitive to many, and could translate into a 
risk posing object for CBM-lite. 
The above are examples of a shift from risk posing object to threatened objects at risk. Not 
all fluidity is in that direction. Former WUC members – themselves bundled out of elected 
office by the innovation - could become risk posing objects to the new single Water 
Operators. Petulant and obstructive behaviour, signs of which have already been witnessed, 
could undermine the implementation of CBM-lite and its appointed officials. 
The contrary and differing results garnered from the surveys and public meetings warrant 
investigation. The surveys that were conducted prior to setting up the CBM-lite pilot were 
highly supportive of paying for water, of having a single operator paid from collected fees, 
and of using a SACCO to store collected fees with an insurance policy. Yet post-appointment 
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a very different picture began to emerge in the public meetings – disquiet over paying - 
raising potential questions for the viability of CBM-lite. Possible explanations include, firstly: 
selected villages were admittedly problem ones with very high levels of breakdown and 
ineffective WUCs (the reason for targeting them initially). Enthusiasm for anything that could 
bring improvement could account for inflated initial support. Secondly, the surveys took 
place in homes and were predominantly answered by women - the ones most burdened 
with collecting water, along with their children, and who tend to be more focused on family 
health. The objections and risk protests were later voiced by men in the public meetings. 
There is an important gender element here to augment the water, money, power nexus 
(Swyngedouw 2006). Thirdly, the public meetings to determine rules were mostly male-
dominated and occurred near to the time of implementation. As we move from the distant 
and hypothetical to the imminent and actual switch to CBM-lite, should we expect to see risk 
aversion increasing?  From the foregoing we argue that innovators need to be wary of 
placing too much faith in surveys in general, and willingness to pay surveys in particular, as 
a foundation for rolling out an innovation, and that the gender of research participants can 
skew results.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Our novel application of relational risk theory to an innovation in the rural water sector in 
Uganda has proved illuminating: it has helped disentangle a messy web of complex and 
contradictory behaviour patterns. It has demonstrated to us that for many stakeholders the 
known risks of CBM may be preferable to potential harm to ideology (social justice), policy 
coherence, organisational reputation, and social and cultural norms, which is an important 
contribution to the geography of water literature and practitioner debates.  Unpacking 
sectoral inertia in Uganda assumes greater significance when we consider that 57% of the 
global population will be reliant on communally managed water sources by 2020 (Joint 
Monitoring Program, 2011).  
 
The analysis suggests we have a classic ‘wicked problem’ (Rittel & Webber 1973), where a 
solution for one group is a problem generator for another. CBM-lite, in its attempt to bolster 
user payment with an incentivised Water Operator met with resistance because it had the 
potential to curtail free-riding which was widely practised under CBM.  Fundamentally, the 
study questions the level of support for the user pays principle, central to both mainstream 
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CBM and CBM-lite. We are keen to promote a sector-wide debate over the financing of post-
construction support because of the apparent incompatibility between social justice and the 
human right to water on the one hand, and the user pays principle. 
 
Knowledge is said to be the key to risk management, for it helps to generate trust and 
neutralise a perceived threat of harm (Dobbie and Brown, 2014) and so we argue that the 
sector needs to embrace experimentation and encourage shared learning from the outcome 
of trials. Colvin et al. (2014) believe that the way to break the deadlock is through a body of 
evidence that cannot be ignored at the centre. However, this faces obstacles from the 
government, which sees experimentation as threatening policy coherence. Nevertheless, 
the power to make sector-wide change rests with central government itself. Further, whether 
the rural water sector is ready to publicise and learn from failure, an essential part of 
experimentation, is debatable: the Rural Water Supply Network, in calling for 2016 forum 
entries, stipulates “papers must relate to practices and innovations that have been proven 
to work” 8.  As things currently stand, the comfortable mantra ‘better the devil you know’ may 
indeed render any proposed innovation that threatens mainstream CBM dead in the water.   
 
 
  
  
                                                        
8 https://rwsn7.net/participate/submissions/ 
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